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Abstract— Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is the most widely 
used security mechanism for securing communications over the 
network. However, there are known performance issues, making 
it unsuitable for use in the Vehicular Networks (VNs). In this 
paper, we propose a Secure and Authenticated Key Management 
Protocol (SA-KMP) to overcome the shortcomings of the PKI. The 
SA-KMP scheme distributes repository containing the bindings of 
the entity’s identity and its corresponding public key to each 
vehicle and Road Side Unit (RSU). By doing so, certificate 
exchanges and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) are 
eliminated. Furthermore, SA-KMP scheme uses symmetric keys 
derived based on a 3D matrix based key agreement scheme to 
reduce the high computational costs of using asymmetric 
cryptography. We demonstrate the efficiency of the SA-KMP 
through performance evaluations in terms of transmission and 
storage overhead, network latency and key generation time. 
Analytical results show that the SA-KMP is more scalable and 
outperforms the certificate based PKI. Simulation results indicate 
that the key generation time of the SA-KMP scheme is less than 
that of the existing Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) and 
Diffie-Hellman (DH) protocols. In addition, we use Proverif to 
prove that the SA-KMP scheme is secure against an active 
attacker under the Dolev and Yao model and further show that 
the SA-KMP scheme is secure against Denial of Service (DoS), 
collusion attacks and a wide range of other malicious attacks. 
 
Index Terms— Certificate-less PKI, Hybrid Cryptosystems, 
Proverif, 3D Matrix based Key Agreement 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
n recent years, there has been a change of research emphasis     
from Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) to intelligence 
vehicles which lead to the development of Cooperative 
Intelligence  Transport  System (C-ITS). In C-ITS, all the 
elements of the transport chain ranging from the public 
transport down to the road users are connected to form a 
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Vehicular Network (VN). It aims to improve the public road 
safety and optimize the traffic management [1]-[3]. In general, 
a VN comprises of two network entities: road users and Road 
Side Units (RSUs). The road users are vehicles, pedestrians, 
motorized cyclists, etc. traveling at different speeds while the 
RSUs are statically deployed to form the backbone of the 
network. In such a configuration, different modes of 
communications can be realized, namely the Vehicle to 
Infrastructure (V2I), Infrastructure to Vehicle (I2V), Vehicle to 
Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle to Pedestrians (V2P). To enable 
these devices to communicate, each entity is equipped with an 
On-Board Unit (OBU) that employs the Dedicated Short Range 
Communications (DSRC) technology [4]. Besides the safety 
and traffic optimization applications, VNs have also evolved to 
become a service provider to support value-added services such 
as the infotainment applications and Internet access 
provisioning. 
To support these diverse applications, an efficient key 
management system is needed to ensure secure and reliable 
exchanges of information. A traditional approach is to use a 
certificate-based Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) as 
recommended in the IEEE 1609.2 [5] and the ETSI TS 102 940 
standards [6]. The PKI uses the public key cryptography with 
digital certificates to provide confidentiality, authenticity, 
integrity, and non-repudiation. However, several issues impede 
the deployment of PKI [7] in the VNs. First of all, a vehicle 
needs to distribute its public key certificate signed by the 
Certificate Authority (CA) to other users. This results in the 
wastage of communication bandwidth. After receiving the 
certificate, each entity has to (1) verify the expiry date of the 
certificate, (2) check the validity of the certificate against a 
Certification Revocation List (CRL) and (3) verify the CA’s 
digital signature on the signed certificate. These requirements 
introduce much latency which is undesirable for most VNs 
applications. It is also necessary to distribute a huge CRL, 
which does not scale well with increasing network size. 
Moreover, if the CRLs are not disseminated on time, a recipient 
will be at risks of accepting an expired or previously revoked 
certificate [7]. 
Motivated by the shortcomings of the PKI, we propose an 
efficient Secure and Authenticated Key Management Protocol 
(SA-KMP) to overcome the complex verification process 
inherent in all the certificate-based PKI schemes. Our work 
combines two prior works, namely the Public Key Regime 
(PKR) [18] and the 3D matrix key distribution scheme [10], 
[11]. The PKR eliminates the exchange of digital certificates by 
delegating the distribution of public keys to the RSUs while the 
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3D matrix key scheme generates common keys for use in 
symmetric encryption to reduce the dependence on expensive 
asymmetric operations. The major contributions of our work 
are summarized below: 
 
1) Develop a messaging protocol for negotiating pairwise 
keys in a V2I/I2V and V2V communication. 
2) Develop a novel key distribution scheme based on the 3D 
matrix key scheme to generate the keys dynamically 
instead of preloading the keys. 
3) Incorporate an authentication mechanism into the PKR 
scheme and key distribution scheme to mitigate Denial of 
Service (DoS) attacks. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews 
the related work. Section III describes the system model and 
highlights our design considerations. Section IV discusses the 
mechanisms and the framework of the SA-KMP. Section V 
discusses the security properties of our scheme. Section VI 
analyzes the performance of our scheme. Section VII concludes 
the paper. 
 
II. RELATED WORKS 
There are many methods to reduce the high costs of 
deploying a PKI which we classify into three types. The first 
approach is to secure the messages using symmetric 
cryptography rather than asymmetric cryptography. By the 
symmetric cryptography, the communicating parties have to 
know the secret key before encryption. Thus, several key 
distribution schemes have been proposed in the literature to 
distribute the keys securely. The second method is to avoid the 
use of digital certificates entirely so that expensive operations 
related to certificate management are eliminated. The third 
method is by reducing the CRL checking delay. 
A. Key Distribution Schemes 
In [12], J. Almeida et al. have proposed a probabilistic key 
sharing scheme where each vehicle is given a key ring 
containing 𝑘𝑘 keys drawn randomly from a large pool of 𝑃𝑃 keys. 
For any two vehicles to determine a common key, each of them 
has to broadcast the list of the key identifiers on their key ring 
using a challenge-response protocol. In [13], D.A. Don et al. 
have introduced the multivariate polynomial scheme by which 
two vehicles establish a key by substituting the unique ID into 
its own univariate polynomial share pre-loaded by the 
authority. Since the univariate polynomials are extracted from a 
symmetric bivariate polynomial of degree 𝑡𝑡, it follows that two 
communicating vehicles can derive the same common keys. In 
[14] and [15], Y. Zhang et al. have proposed to establish a 
pairwise key based on the symmetry properties of the matrix 
operations. The authority first creates a public matrix G and a 
secret symmetric matrix D and then generates another public 
matrix A which is the transpose of the matrix G and D. The two 
communicating parties establish a common key by multiplying 
the two public matrices together. In [16], HT. Wu et al have 
proposed to use the Diffie-Hellman (DH) protocol to establish a 
secret key. The secret key is then passed as an input into a hash 
chain to generate as many session keys as the number of RSUs 
in  the  region.   In   [17],   a  distributed  group  key agreement 
scheme is proposed based on the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman 
(ECDH) protocol which is adaptable to membership changes in 
a group. In [10] and [11], M.A. Hamid et al have proposed a 3D 
matrix key distribution scheme by which both parties solve a 
system of plane equations to identify the common intersection 
points they share. The key preloaded at each intersection point 
is then used to secure the communications. By all of the 
abovementioned schemes, the public key cryptography is 
required to protect the exchange of key information for deriving 
the common keys which means that an adversary could launch 
DoS attacks by sending a lot of bogus messages for 
verifications. Additionally, the schemes in [10]-[12] are 
susceptible to the node capture attacks because the adversary 
can compromise a node physically to extract the preloaded 
keys. 
B. Certificate-less PKI 
In [18], P.Y. Shen et al. have proposed the Public Key 
Regime (PKR) scheme to reduce the cost of managing 
certificates. Each RSU is given a read-only copy of a public key 
directory by the Trusted Authority (TA). The public key 
directory contains the vehicle identifiers and their 
corresponding public keys that have previously been certified 
by a TA. By distributing the public key directory to the RSUs, it 
eliminates the exchange and verification of the certificates. 
However, the PKR is not secured against the DoS and collusion 
attacks since a malicious vehicle can send many public key 
request messages to overwhelm the RSU. 
C. Simple CRL Check 
In [19], A.H. Salem et al. have introduced the RSU managers 
into the PKI hierarchy to keep track of the RSUs that assist the 
requesting vehicles. This scheme can improve the revocation 
process because the revocation message is only sent to the RSU 
that has the highest probability of contacting the moving 
vehicle. In [20], an Expedite Message Authentication Protocol 
(EMAP) has been proposed based on the keyed-Hash Message 
Authentication Code (HMAC) with the probabilistic key 
sharing scheme. The HMAC is verified first before the digital 
certificate is checked thereby improving the CRL checking 
process. On the other hand, the probabilistic key sharing 
mechanism helps to update the key used for the HMAC. 
However, by both schemes, a CRL is still required to distribute 
certification revocation information which increases the 
communication overhead. 
In this paper, SA-KMP is developed based on integrating the 
PKR scheme [18] and the 3D matrix key scheme [10], [11] 
together. Using these two concepts as a basis, we propose 
further extensions to provide resilience against DoS attacks and 
node capture attacks. Table I highlights the novelty of the SA-
KMP scheme by comparing it with the existing works. 
 
III. SYSTEM MODEL 
In this section, we describe the network model, the 
communication model, the security model, our design 
considerations and the assumptions used. 
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TABLE I 
  COMPARISON VERSUS RELATED WORKS  
 
Scheme Mechanism (A) (B) (C) 
Probability based[12] Preload х х х 
Polynomial based[13] Dynamic key generation х √ х 
Matrix based[14], [15] Dynamic key generation - √ х 
DH based[16], [17]] Dynamic key generation х √ х 
3D matrix based[10],[11] Preload - х х 
PKR [18] Certificate-less √ - х 
[19] Reduce CRL check х - х 
[20] Reduce CRL check х - х 
Proposed SA-KMP Certificate-less + 
Dynamic key generation 
√ √ √ 
(A) Certificate-less, (B) Resilient against Node Capture, (C) Resilient 
against DoS attack 
 
A. Network Model 
We consider a VN deployed in an urban area consisting of 
three entities: 
 
(1) Regional Transport Authority (RTA) - The RTA is in 
charge of the management of the vehicles and RSUs in a 
geographical area. It is responsible for the registration of 
vehicles and RSUs, issuance of private/public key pairs, 
creation of the public repositories including updating and 
dissemination of the repositories. It is fully trusted by all the 
vehicles and RSUs in the deployment area and is equipped with 
advanced security mechanisms to prevent any information 
leakage. Thus, it has the highest level of security and cannot be 
compromised. 
(2) Road Side Units (RSUs) - The RSUs are statically and 
strategically deployed to bridge the communication among the 
vehicles or RSUs in the network. They are installed at traffic 
lights, lamp posts or road signs, etc. They are connected to the 
RTA via a secure network and are equipped with multiple 
interfaces for interoperability with different access 
technologies. We assume that the RSUs are supported by the 
location-based services that enable them to know their location 
and the locations of other entities within their communication 
range. They take part in the pairwise key agreement for 
V2I/I2V and V2V communications. It is assumed that the 
RSUs have no resource constraints regarding storage and 
computing power and that the majority of the RSUs is trusted. 
(3) Vehicles - The vehicles are either static or mobile, 
traveling on the network at various speeds. They are equipped 
with OBUs to support communications with other vehicles and 
RSUs. The OBU of a vehicle is also installed with the Global 
Positioning Service (GPS) to provide useful information about 
the car’s position and the position of other entities on the road. 
We assume that some vehicles are not trusted. 
B. Communication Model 
We consider two types of communication in the VNs, 
namely the V2I and V2V. The V2I mode refers to the 
communication between the RSU and the vehicle and vice 
versa. An example of V2I is the periodic broadcast of beacon 
messages containing the vehicle’s speed or position 
information to the RSU whereas I2V refers to the sending of 
safety related messages from the RSU to the vehicles. V2V, on 
the other hand, refers to the ad-hoc communication among the 
vehicles on the road. They exchange information such as 
warning messages to alert other drivers on the accidents or 
collisions ahead. To secure these two types of communication, 
we define a pairwise key to be shared between two entities in a 
V2I or V2V communication. 
C. Attack and Security Model 
Attacks can be classified into two types: passive and active 
attacks. The passive attackers monitor the communication 
channel to gather sensitive information without modifying the 
information. On the other hand, the active attackers as 
described by the Dolev and Yao attacker model [21], may 
intercept messages, alter them or replay the original messages 
to gain access to confidential information. The attackers can 
also act irrationally if the benefits outweigh the risk of being 
detected. Interested readers may refer to [2], [8] and [22] for a 
comprehensive coverage of the threats and the attacks. In this 
paper, we consider the presence of active attackers such as the 
DoS and collusion attacks, which can be launched by the 
attackers when the vehicles request for public keys from the 
RSU and vice versa. The DoS attacks can also occur during the 
key agreement process. In terms of security capability, we 
assume that the vehicles and RSUs are fitted with a Hardware 
Security Module (HSM) responsible for storing, and physically 
protecting the cryptographic information similar to the 
implementation in [22]. Confidential information stored in the 
HSM includes node ID, node’s private key/public key, RTA’s 
public key, session keys and some cryptomaterial used for 
establishing the pairwise keys. In addition, the HSM is 
responsible for performing cryptographic key operations during 
key establishment. 
D. Design Considerations 
The SA-KMP scheme is developed based on the following 
considerations. The SA-KMP has to be efficient due to the 
strict delay requirements of VN applications. Distribution and 
verification of public keys cannot be too complex to reduce the 
high overhead and delay. At the same time, it should not 
compromise on the level of security. It has to be lightweight 
due to the limited computing capability of the vehicles as 
compared to the RSU. As the number vehicles increases, the 
number of certificates or keys will also increase. Therefore, it is 
important that our scheme is highly adaptable and scalable to 
the growth of the network. Furthermore, all the messages in the 
V2I or V2V communications must be protected against any 
data modifications to ensure information integrity. If messages 
are modified intentionally, it could lead to adverse 
consequences such as loss of lives. Recipients of a message 
must also be able to verify the authenticity of the message, that 
is, the message is sent by an authorized entity with the proper 
signing key. The SA-KMP must also be able to guarantee non-
repudiation property where the sender or receiver of a 
message cannot deny having sent or received the message. 
Lastly, the information in a message must be kept secret and 
protected from unauthorized access at all times to ensure data 
confidentiality. 
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Fig. 1. SA-KMP Framework 
 
IV. THE SA-KMP FRAMEWORK 
Figure 1 describes the various modules of the SA-KMP 
scheme and their interactions with external entities such as the 
RSU and the vehicles. The five modules are the System Setup, 
Public Key Request, Key Agreement, Key Derivation and 
Revocation. Table II defines the notations used in this paper. 
A. System Setup Module 
This module is executed by the RTA and consists of 3 steps. 
Step 1 (Initialization): The deployment area is divided into a 
3D space (𝑚𝑚  ×  𝑚𝑚  ×  𝑚𝑚) where 𝑚𝑚 represents  the size of   the 
area. Each entity occupies a unique location denoted by (𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗, 𝑘𝑘) 
in the 3D space. The RTA determines the domain parameters (𝑝𝑝, 𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏, 𝐺𝐺, 𝑛𝑛, ℎ) for the elliptic curve 𝐸𝐸 defined over the finite 
field, 𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝 where 𝑝𝑝 is a large prime number and 𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏 are the 
parameters   that   define   the   elliptic   curve   𝐸𝐸   of    the 
form 𝑦𝑦2 (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑝𝑝) = 𝑥𝑥3 + 𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 + 𝑏𝑏 (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑝𝑝). 𝐺𝐺 is the generator 
denoted by a point (𝐺𝐺𝑥𝑥, 𝐺𝐺𝑦𝑦 ) chosen from the elliptic curve, 𝑛𝑛 is 
the order of the generator, ℎ is the cofactor and ℎ: {0,1}∗ → 𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝 
is  a  secure  hash   function.   All   the   system   parameters (𝑝𝑝, 𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏, 𝐺𝐺, 𝑛𝑛, ℎ)  are   made   public  to   all  the  entities  in the 
network. The RTA then generates a set of 𝑁𝑁 plane equations 
having this form given in (1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where (𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 , 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 ) denotes the GPS location of the entity and the 
subscript 𝑖𝑖 represents the ID of the entity. The parameter, 
 
𝑚𝑚 denotes the size of the 3D space and 𝑐𝑐1 , 𝑐𝑐2 , ⋯ , 𝑐𝑐𝑁𝑁 are 
constants of the plane equations where 𝑐𝑐1 ≠ 𝑐𝑐2 ≠ ⋯ ≠ 𝑐𝑐6 ≠ 
𝑐𝑐𝑁𝑁 . The constants are selected such that the rank of the 
coefficient matrix is of full rank. It guarantees that there is 
always a unique solution to a system of three plane equations. 
Next,  the  RTA  generates  another   three   hash   functions (𝐻𝐻1 , 𝐻𝐻2 , 𝐻𝐻3 ) which are used for deriving the common keys and 
creates two directories, namely the RSU-Public File Directory 
(RSU-PFD) and the Vehicle Public Directory (VPFD) to store 
the entities’ public keys. 
 
Step 2 (Registration): Each entity 𝑖𝑖 creates its own 
private/public (𝑘𝑘−/𝑘𝑘+) key pair and registers its public key 
with the RTA. For each registration entity, the RTA generates a 
unique ID and binds the entity’s public key to its ID. If the 
registration  entity  is  an  RSU,  the  RTA  stores  the  binding < 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼, 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑦𝑦 > inside the RSU-PFD. On the other hand, if 
the registration entity is a vehicle, the RTA stores the entry 
inside  the  VPFD.   In   addition   to   storing  the  bindings   < 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼, 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑦𝑦 >, the VPFD also stores the RTA’s signature 
that is created from the vehicle’s ID and its certified public key 
of each entry. This is to prevent a malicious RSU from issuing a 
signature on a wrong public key. 
 
Step 3 (Dissemination): After a successful registration, the 
RTA disseminates a read-only copy of the VPFD to each RSU 
and a read-only copy of the RSU-PFD to each vehicle. Both 
directories are updated whenever a new entity joins the 
network or when an entity’s public key is revoked. The size of 
the VPFD is finite as a vehicle will be de-registered and 
removed from the directory upon reaching its end-of-life. The 
RSU-PFD rarely increases in size because the number of RSUs 
in the network is fixed. The benefits of disseminating up-to-
date directories are threefold: (1) eliminates the need to 
download huge certificate revocation list, (2) reduces the time 
𝑧𝑧  − 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖   + 𝑐𝑐1(𝑦𝑦 − 𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖) + 𝑐𝑐2(𝑥𝑥 − 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)  =  0 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(𝑚𝑚) 
𝑧𝑧  − 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖   + 𝑐𝑐3(𝑦𝑦 − 𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖)+ 𝑐𝑐4(𝑥𝑥 − 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )  =  0 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(𝑚𝑚) 
𝑧𝑧 − 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖   + 𝑐𝑐5(𝑦𝑦 − 𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 ) +  𝑐𝑐6(𝑥𝑥 −  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)  = 0 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(𝑚𝑚) 
∀ 𝑐𝑐1, 𝑐𝑐2, ⋯ , 𝑐𝑐𝑁𝑁 
 
 
(1) 
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TABLE II 
  NOTATIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS  
values to prevent the replay attacks while the 𝐶𝐶𝒱𝒱 and 𝐶𝐶ℛ are 
commitment values used to provide entity authenticity and as a 
knowledge proof that the prover has verified the digital 
signature. The nonce and commitment values are pre-computed 
off-line or during the idle state of the entity’s processor to make 
the scheme efficient. 
 
Step 3: Suppose 𝒱𝒱 wants to communicate with another vehicle, 
it constructs a public key query message 𝑀𝑀𝒱𝒱 containing its own 
ID and the ID of the target vehicle, e.g. 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼3 and sends it to ℛ. 
This message also contains the 𝒱𝒱’s random nonce value 𝑅𝑅 𝒱𝒱. 
 
Step 4: Upon receiving (𝑀𝑀𝒱𝒱 , 𝑅𝑅𝒱𝒱 ) from 𝒱𝒱 , ℛ generates a 
signature  pair  (𝑘𝑘ℛ , 𝑆𝑆ℛ )  consisting  of  a  challenge,  𝑘𝑘ℛ    and a 
response, 𝑆𝑆ℛ  according to the formula given by step 4 in Figure 
2   and   sends  the   tuple  (𝑘𝑘ℛ , 𝑆𝑆ℛ , 𝑅𝑅ℛ )  to  𝒱𝒱 .   The challenge 
𝑘𝑘ℛ   contains  the  hash  of  the  message,  including  the random 
nonce    values   (𝑅𝑅𝒱𝒱   ,  𝑅𝑅ℛ )   and   the   𝑥𝑥𝐶𝐶ℛ      coordinate   of the 
commitment value, 𝐶𝐶ℛ of ℛ that is used as a proof to determine 
if 𝒱𝒱 has verified the signature. 
 
Step 5: When 𝒱𝒱 receives (𝑘𝑘ℛ , 𝑆𝑆ℛ , 𝑅𝑅ℛ ) from ℛ, it first retrieves 
the   ℛ  ’s   public   key   𝑘𝑘+   from   the   RSU-PFD.   Then,  𝒱𝒱 
re-computes the ℛ’s commitment  value as 𝐶𝐶ℛ    = 𝐺𝐺 ∙ 𝑆𝑆ℛ  +  𝑘𝑘+ ∙ 
𝑘𝑘ℛ using the values 𝑆𝑆ℛ , 𝑘𝑘ℛ and 𝑘𝑘+ . Next, 𝒱𝒱 calculates its 
version of the challenge denoted as 𝑘𝑘𝑒𝑒ℛ𝑒 by taking the hash of the 
message,  𝑀𝑀𝒱𝒱   concatenated  with both the random nonce values (𝑅𝑅𝒱𝒱 , 𝑅𝑅ℛ )  and  the  calculated  𝑥𝑥𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒ℛ𝑒𝑒 coordinate  of 𝐶𝐶ℛ   computed 
earlier. If the calculated hash value matches the received 𝑘𝑘ℛ , it 
implies that ℛ is authenticated successfully. If there is a 
mismatch, the session terminates at this stage. The proof of 
correctness is shown in (2) and (3). 
 
 
and complexity required to verify the certificates and (3) 
improve the timeliness and freshness of public keys. Next, the 
RTA issues the 𝑁𝑁 plane equations and the hash functions (𝐻𝐻1 , 𝐻𝐻2 , 𝐻𝐻3 ) to each entity which are kept in the HSM for 
protection. 
B. Public Key Request Module 
This module is installed in each entity. It is invoked when the 
vehicle or the RSU receives public key request messages from 
the other entities. It contains an authentication mechanism 
similar to the one in [9] to mitigate the effects of internal and 
external DoS attacks. However, we improve the efficiency of 
the scheme based on the ECC technology. The key idea is to 
make the requestors expends an equal amount of computing 
power when it requests for a public key from the RSU. This 
involves verifying an EC-Schnorr signature to prove their 
identity and authenticity. Figure 2 illustrates the process 
between a vehicle 𝒱𝒱 and an RSU ℛ during the execution of the 
public key request module. 
 
Step  1  and  Step  2:  First, 𝒱𝒱 and ℛ select  one random value, 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑛𝑛 − 1] and a 128 bits random nonce 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 where 𝑖𝑖 stands 
for the identifier of the entity and computes 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 according to the 
 
 
 
 
If 𝑘𝑘𝑒𝑒ℛ𝑒 = 𝑘𝑘ℛ , the signature pair (𝑘𝑘ℛ , 𝑠𝑠ℛ ) from ℛ passes the 
verification. Once the challenge 𝑒𝑘𝑘𝑒ℛ𝑒 is verified true, 𝒱𝒱  prepares 
its own signature consisting  of  a  challenge  𝑘𝑘𝒱𝒱  and  a 
response 𝑆𝑆𝒱𝒱 . At the same time, 𝒱𝒱 computes a proof 𝑣𝑣𝒱𝒱 which 
contains a hash of the two random nonce  values and the 𝑥𝑥𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒ℛ𝑒𝑒 
coordinate of 𝐶𝐶ℛ . Message to ℛ contains (𝑣𝑣𝒱𝒱 , 𝑘𝑘𝒱𝒱 , 𝑆𝑆𝒱𝒱 ). 
Step 6:  Before  ℛ  proceeds  to  verify  the  signature  pair  (𝑘𝑘𝒱𝒱 , 𝑆𝑆𝒱𝒱 ) of 𝒱𝒱. It first checks that the hash value 𝑣𝑣𝒱𝒱 is correct by 
computing ℎ(𝑅𝑅𝒱𝒱 , 𝑅𝑅ℛ,𝑥𝑥𝐶𝐶ℛ ) using its own commitment value, 
𝑥𝑥𝐶𝐶ℛ of 𝐶𝐶ℛ generated in step 2. The signature pair (𝑘𝑘𝒱𝒱 , 𝑆𝑆𝒱𝒱 ) needs 
to be verified only if the proof matches. If the proof provided by 
𝒱𝒱 is incorrect, it implies that 𝒱𝒱 has not verified the signature in 
step 5. Therefore, ℛ discards the message without verifying. If 
the hash value 𝑣𝑣𝒱𝒱 is correct, ℛ proceeds to locate the public  
key of 𝒱𝒱 in the VPFD and performs the verification process to 
compute the commitment value of 𝒱𝒱 as shown in step 6. 
formula in step 2 of Figure 2. The 𝑅𝑅𝒱𝒱 and 𝑅𝑅ℛ values are nonce Lastly,  ℛ  verifies  if 𝑘𝑘𝒱𝒱 = ℎ(𝑚𝑚, 𝑅𝑅𝒱𝒱 , 𝑅𝑅ℛ , 𝑥𝑥𝐶𝐶𝒱𝒱 , 𝐶𝐶ℛ ) matches the 
Notations Description 
m × m × m Dimensions of 3D space 
(𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 ,𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 ) 3D location of vehicle or RSU 𝑖𝑖 
𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝, 𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝 𝑥𝑥 and 𝑦𝑦 coordinates of point 𝑝𝑝 in affine representation 
𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 , 𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏 Constants of a plane equation 
𝐻𝐻1, 𝐻𝐻2, 𝐻𝐻3 Secure hash functions along each axis in 3D space 
𝑘𝑘− 𝑖𝑖 Private key of vehicle or RSU 𝑖𝑖 
𝑘𝑘+ 𝑖𝑖 Public key of vehicle or RSU 𝑖𝑖 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 , 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 Cryptographic nonce and commitment value of vehicle or 
RSU 𝑖𝑖 (𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ) Signature pair issued by vehicle or RSU 𝑖𝑖 
𝒱𝒱 and ℛ Represent vehicle and RSU entity. 
𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 Hash value issued by vehicle or RSU 𝑖𝑖 as proof {𝑀𝑀}𝑘𝑘+ 
𝑖𝑖 Message M is encrypted by public key of vehicle or RSU 
𝑖𝑖 
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘− (𝑀𝑀) 
𝑖𝑖 Signature of message M signed by private key of vehicle 
or RSU 𝑖𝑖 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 GPS location of vehicle or RSU 𝑖𝑖 
𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 Nonce value of vehicle or RSU 𝑖𝑖 used in key agreement 
module 
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 Timestamp of vehicle 𝑖𝑖 used in key agreement module 
𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 ,𝑗𝑗 Pairwise key between vehicle 𝑖𝑖 and RSU 𝑗𝑗 
𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 , 𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿 Lower bound (LB)and upper bound (UB) of the expiry 
time of derived keys 
𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 , 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿 Lower bound (LB) and upper bound (UB) of the distance 
that derived keys stay valid. 
𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆 Average speed of vehicle in m/s 
 
𝐶𝐶ℛ𝑒    = 𝐺𝐺 ∙ 𝑆𝑆ℛ  + 𝑘𝑘+ ∙ 𝑘𝑘ℛ     = 𝐺𝐺 ∙ (𝑐𝑐ℛ  − 𝑏𝑏 ∙ 𝑘𝑘ℛ ) + 𝑘𝑘+ ∙ 𝑘𝑘ℛ 
ℛ ℛ = 𝐺𝐺 ∙ 𝑐𝑐ℛ − 𝑘𝑘+ ∙ 𝑘𝑘ℛ + 𝑘𝑘+ ∙ 𝑘𝑘ℛ ℛ ℛ = 𝑐𝑐ℛ  ∙ 𝐺𝐺 
 
(2) 
𝑘𝑘ℛ𝑒    = ℎ(𝑀𝑀𝒱𝒱 , 𝑅𝑅𝒱𝒱 , 𝑅𝑅ℛ , 𝑥𝑥𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒ℛ𝑒𝑒) (3) 
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Fig. 2. Authentication process in the Public Key Request Module 
received 𝑘𝑘𝒱𝒱 . If 𝑘𝑘𝒱𝒱 = 𝑘𝑘𝒱𝒱 , ℛ issues the requested public key. 
Otherwise, ℛ terminates at this step. The reply message to 𝒱𝒱 
contains the requested ID, the requested public key and the 
RTA’s signature on the < 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼, 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑦𝑦 > binding which are 
retrieved from the VPFD. The entire message is encrypted 
using 𝒱𝒱’s public key to ensure confidentiality. The inclusion of 
the RTA’s signature is to ensure the integrity and authenticity 
of the message. When 𝒱𝒱 receives the reply message, it decrypts 
the message using its own public key 𝑘𝑘+ and verify the RTA’s 
signature using 𝑘𝑘+ . If the signature is correct, it means  that  
the requested public key issued by ℛ is correct. 
C. Key Agreement Module 
Figure 3 describes the messaging protocol between two 
communicating entities during pairwise keys establishment. As 
the messaging protocol involves message exchanges, attackers 
can send invalid messages to deplete the resources of the 
recipients leading to DoS attacks. To solve this, we incorporate 
the authentication mechanism similar to the one used in the 
public key request module. The working principle is the same 
whereby both entities must prove to each other their intentions 
to derive the pairwise keys by committing some of their CPU 
resources. The only difference is that the exchanged messages 
contain additional information such as the randomly generated 
nonce (𝑁𝑁ℛ , 𝑁𝑁𝒱𝒱 ) and the GPS information (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀ℛ , 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝒱𝒱  ) of 
ℛ  and  𝒱𝒱  respectively  which   is  necessary  for  deriving  the 
pairwise keys. 
Once  the  GPS   locations   and   the   random   nonce 
values (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝒱𝒱 , 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀ℛ , 𝑁𝑁𝒱𝒱 , 𝑁𝑁ℛ ) are known, 𝒱𝒱 and ℛ transit 
into the key derivation module to derive the pairwise keys. In 
this case, 𝒱𝒱 can use any of the derived pairwise keys denoted as 
𝐾𝐾𝒱𝒱,ℛ to encrypt the messages via a symmetric algorithm. 
HMAC is appended to the message to prove authenticity and 
integrity. The timestamp is also included in the message to 
prevent replay attacks. In order for ℛ to know which pairwise 
key is used to decrypt the actual message, the pairwise key is 
indexed by 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑦𝑦𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 and sent to ℛ. The format of the message 
sent      by     vehicle      𝒱𝒱      to     RSU     ℛ      is     given    as: 
𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑦𝑦𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,  {𝑀𝑀𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘,  𝑇𝑇𝒱𝒱 , 𝐻𝐻𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶(𝐾𝐾𝒱𝒱,ℛ ||𝑀𝑀𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘||𝑇𝑇𝒱𝒱 )}𝐾𝐾𝒱𝒱,ℛ . 
When ℛ receives the message from 𝒱𝒱 , it uses the 
corresponding pairwise key indexed by the key ID to decrypt 
the actual message. Our pairwise key agreement protocol can 
also be extended to support group communications in a V2V 
context with the help of an RSU. After the RSU has derived the 
pairwise keys, it can behave as a mediator to authenticate the 
other vehicles and distribute the set of common keys to each of 
the authenticated vehicles that the requesting vehicle wants to 
communicate with. Once the group vehicles have received the 
common keys, they can start the secure communication within 
the group without further interactions with the RSU. Moreover, 
our scheme can also be applied to the pairwise V2V 
communications. However, the initiating vehicle has to contact 
the RSU first to request for the recipient’s public key because 
the vehicles do not have the VPFD repository. Thereafter, the 
rest of the procedure in V2V follows the messaging protocol in 
Figure 3. 
D. Key Derivation Module 
This module leverages on the 3D matrix key approach to 
generate the pairwise keys. However, instead of preloading the 
keys onto the vehicles and the RSUs, each entity derives the 
keys dynamically. We illustrate the procedure of obtaining the 
pairwise keys in a V2I communication where each entity has 𝑁𝑁 
plane equations as defined in equation (1). 
Both entities have to solve the 𝑁𝑁 plane equations in groups 
of 3 to determine the solutions. For example, 𝒱𝒱 inputs its own 
GPS location (𝑖𝑖𝒱𝒱 , 𝑗𝑗𝒱𝒱 , 𝑘𝑘𝒱𝒱 ) into the first plane equation and 
substitute the GPS location (𝑖𝑖ℛ , 𝑗𝑗ℛ , 𝑘𝑘ℛ ) of ℛ into the second 
plane equation in (1). For the third plane equation, 𝒱𝒱 uses its 
own randomly generated nonce value 𝑁𝑁𝒱𝒱 (Message 2 of the key 
agreement protocol) as the first input for 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and the second 
nonce value 𝑁𝑁ℛ generated by ℛ (Message 3 of the key 
agreement protocol) as the second input for 𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 . The last input 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 
of the third equation can be found by either hashing the first and 
the second nonce values or XOR-ing the two nonce values 
together. The random nonce values guarantee the uniqueness of 
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Fig. 3. Exchange of keying materials for establishing pairwise key in V2I 
 
the derived keys. It ensures that another vehicle with the same 
GPS coordinates communicating with the same RSU will not 
derive the same keys as the vehicles. With 3 sets of inputs to 
substitute into  the 𝑁𝑁 plane equations,  there are𝑁𝑁(𝑁𝑁 − 1)(𝑁𝑁 − 2) equation  groups  to  solve  which  generate  𝑁𝑁(𝑁𝑁 − 1)(𝑁𝑁  − 2) unique solutions.  The  set  of solutions is described  by 𝑆𝑆 = {(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧)1, (𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧)2, ⋯ , (𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧)𝑚𝑚 } where (𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧) denotes a 
solution point and 𝑚𝑚 denotes the number of solutions in the set. 
To  derive  the  pairwise   key   at   a   particular   solution 
point (𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧), we define equation (4) where the repeated hash 
results of the concatenation of the two random nonce values 
and the key requestor’s ID is XORed together. In this case, the 
number of hashing operations is determined by the value of 
𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦 and 𝑧𝑧 in the solution point. 
 
𝐾𝐾 (𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧) = 𝐻𝐻𝑥𝑥(𝑁𝑁 ||𝑁𝑁 ||𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 ) ⊕ 𝐻𝐻𝑦𝑦(𝑁𝑁 ||𝑁𝑁 ||𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 ) 
𝒱𝒱,ℛ 1 𝒱𝒱 ℛ 𝒱𝒱 2 𝒱𝒱 ℛ 𝒱𝒱 
⊕ 𝐻𝐻𝑧𝑧(𝑁𝑁 ||𝑁𝑁 ||𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼  ) 3 𝒱𝒱 ℛ 𝒱𝒱 (4) 
 
where 𝐻𝐻𝛽𝛽(∙) denotes that the hashing function 𝐻𝐻 (∙) is repeated 
 
RSU will send a message to the RTA to revoke that vehicle’s 
public key. RTA will update the VPFD and disseminate it to all 
the RSUs in the region via a secure network in real time. It 
implies that future communications with that vehicle are 
disabled unless it re-registers itself with the RTA again to 
receive another set of public/private key pairs. After that, the 
new updated VPFD containing the vehicle‘s new public key 
will be disseminated to all the RSUs. 
On the lifetime of the pairwise keys, we assume that each 
vehicle and RSU sends a message between 100ms-300ms 
according to the WAVE standard [23] and [24]. Furthermore, 
suppose that a shared key can only be used for one message, the 
lower bound and upper bound of the expiry time of the derived 
keys can be determined using (6). 
 
𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿   = (0.1 ∗ # 𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠) 𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠 
𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿   = (0.3 ∗ # 𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠) 𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠 (6) 
 
where # 𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠 = 𝑁𝑁(𝑁𝑁 − 1)(𝑁𝑁 − 2) and 𝑁𝑁 is the 
𝛼𝛼 for 𝛽𝛽 𝛼𝛼 ( )( ) number of plane equations. If 𝑁𝑁 = 10, two communicating 
times.  Similarly,  ℛ  solves  𝑁𝑁  𝑁𝑁 − 1    𝑁𝑁 − 2   equation 
groups and performs the same operations as described in (4) to 
compute the pairwise keys. It can be shown that for any key, 
this condition holds: 𝐾𝐾𝒱𝒱,ℛ = 𝐾𝐾ℛ,𝒱𝒱 . Once the pairwise keys are 
obtained, we can use any key from the 𝑁𝑁(𝑁𝑁 − 1)(𝑁𝑁 − 2) key 
pool for symmetric encryption or decryption. We can also 
choose a subset of 𝛿𝛿 keys from the key pool to compute a 
composite key using the recursive XOR operation as shown in 
(5) where (𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧) is an element of the solution set 𝑆𝑆 and 
contains 𝑚𝑚 solutions. 
 
 
 
 
E. Revocation Module 
In our scheme, both the public key request module and the 
key agreement module rely on the EC-Schnorr signature for 
mutual authentication. If a vehicle fails the authentication, the 
nodes get to keep 720 keys for the duration between 72 seconds 
and 216 seconds before they are destroyed. When the keys 
expire, the nodes need to re-initiate the key agreement module 
again. Using this information, we can further determine how 
many RSUs need to be informed about the derived keys in a 
V2I communication. The formula is given in (7). 
 
𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  = (𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆  ∗ 𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 )𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠 
𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿  = (𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆  ∗ 𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿 )𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠 (7) 
 
where 𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆 is the average speed of the vehicle. Suppose the 
RSUs are 1km apart and the average speed of the vehicle is 
100km/h on a highway, the number of RSUs to inform is 
between 2 and 6. It means that a vehicle does not have to 
establish shared keys each time it passes an RSU which can 
greatly reduce the rekeying overhead. 
𝐾𝐾𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘,𝒱𝒱,ℛ =⊕ 𝐾𝐾𝒱𝒱,ℛ (𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧) 
𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 (𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧) ∈ 𝑆𝑆 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚 2 ≤ 𝛿𝛿 ≤ d (5) 
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V. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF SA-KMP 
We analyze the SA-KMP scheme to prove that it is secured 
against classical attacks such as DoS, eavesdropping, data 
modification, replay, GPS spoofing, node impersonation, 
repudiation, and collusion attacks. For more details on the 
definitions of these attacks, we refer the readers to [2] and [8]. 
We further provide a formal security validation of our scheme 
using the Proverif tool [29]. 
A. Classical Attacks 
DoS Attack – By the proposed SA-KMP scheme, DoS 
attacks are mitigated because the vehicle has to verify the 
signature pair of the RSU to extract the commitment value for 
generating the hash proof as described in Figure 2 and Figure 3. 
The vehicle may try to forge a valid hash proof containing the 
commitment value. However, it is not possible due to the 
property of the one-way hash function. To further illustrate the 
effectiveness of our scheme, we calculate the authentication 
delay when the vehicles flood many signatures to the RSU and 
compare the results to the PKR scheme [18] and the Wasef’s 
scheme [27]. The authentication delay is defined as the time 
incurred by the RSU to verify the signatures from the vehicles. 
We use the ECDSA verification times in Table V and the 
execution time of the HMAC function as 0.008 ms based on 
100000 simulation runs to calculate the authentication delay. 
Figure 4 shows the authentication delay versus the number of 
valid messages for two cases: 1) no DoS and 2) DoS attacks. 
We observe that when the PKR scheme is deployed, the 
introduction of invalid messages (10% and 30% of the number 
of valid messages) increases the authentication delay 
substantially because the PKR scheme has no defense 
mechanism to mitigate the DoS attacks. Consequently, the PKR 
scheme has to verify all the signatures even if they are invalid. 
On the other hand, the Wasef’s scheme appends an HMAC to 
all the outgoing messages when the number of invalid 
signatures to the number of valid signatures exceeds a 
threshold. Therefore, the authentication delay is slightly higher 
than the PKR scheme where it consists of the sum of all the 
ECDSA verification times and the HMAC verification times. In 
contrast, the authentication delay for the SA-KMP scheme is 
significantly lower than that of the PKR scheme and Wasef’s 
scheme under no DoS attack. Furthermore, in the left inset 
figure of Figure 4, the performance of the SA- KMP scheme 
when subjected to 10% and 30% invalid messages, has little 
effect on the authentication delay and is also significantly lower 
than the PKR scheme and the Wasef’s scheme under DoS 
attacks. The SA-KMP scheme is efficient because the RSU 
only has to perform a light step to validate the hash proof 
containing its commitment value. If the proof is incorrect, RSU 
will skip the signature verification. The authentication delay of 
our scheme, in this case, is the sum of the signature generation 
time and the hashing time. A lower authentication delay 
indicates a higher availability to service the requests of other 
vehicles. Based on these observations, we conclude that SA-
KMP does not introduce additional delay and can mitigate DoS 
attackers effectively even though security measures are 
introduced. 
Eavesdropping Attack – The proposed SA-KMP scheme is 
secure against the eavesdropping attacks because all the 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Authentication delay under different scenarios 
messages are encrypted to ensure confidentiality. By the 3D 
matrix based scheme, if 𝑚𝑚 is selected to be a prime and the rank 
of the coefficient matrix is of full rank, then two 
communicating entities have in common 𝑁𝑁(𝑁𝑁 − 1)(𝑁𝑁 − 2) 
distinct keys where 𝑁𝑁 is the number of plane equations. It 
implies that the probability of guessing the correct derived key 
is 1⁄𝑁𝑁(𝑁𝑁 − 1)(𝑁𝑁 − 2) which is low if 𝑁𝑁 is large. Moreover, if 
the SHA-1 encryption is used, each derived key is 160 bits in 
length. The computational complexity to find the correct key is 
therefore 𝐿𝐿(2𝐿𝐿) where 𝐿𝐿 = the length of the key in bits. 
Furthermore, two communicating entities can derive a 
composite session key using some of the derived keys to 
increase the difficulty of cracking the keys. For example, if 
𝑁𝑁 = 10, then there are 720 derived keys between two 
communicating entities. If any 50 keys are selected to compose 
the   composite   key,   there   will   be   at   least  (750) possible 
combinations of the composite keys. 
Data Modification Attack – By the proposed SA-KMP 
scheme, all the messages in the public key request module and 
the key agreement module are digitally signed to detect data 
modifications. Furthermore, in the key agreement module, 
when the shared keys have been established between two 
entities or among a group, an HMAC using one of the derived 
keys is appended to the message to check for the integrity and 
authenticity of the message. 
Replay Attack –By the SA-KMP scheme, random nonce 
values are used in the public key request module including the 
key agreement module to prevent the replay attacks. The nonce 
is at least 128 bits long which implies that the probability of 
getting the same random nonce for two different 
communication sessions is equal to 1⁄2128 . Also, all the 
messages are time-stamped to ensure the freshness. If the 
message is not received within a tolerable period, HMAC 
verification will fail, and the packet will be discarded. 
GPS Spoofing Attack - In the SA-KMP, the external 
attackers are not able to intercept the message and modify the 
GPS coordinates because all the messages are encrypted using 
asymmetric cryptography during the key agreement phase. 
Furthermore, the private key is protected and stored in the HSM 
which is programmed to self-erase when any physical 
tampering is detected. On the other hand, an internal attacker 
may misbehave and modify the GPS coordinates in the LOCM 
message. This form of attack can be prevented because the 
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vehicles and the RSUs are equipped with a GPS receiver to 
perform cross verification on the received GPS coordinates. It 
can also be avoided by employing the verifiable multilateration 
method [28] to verify the vehicles’ positions. Hence, a GPS 
spoofing attack cannot succeed. 
Node Impersonation Attack - By the proposed SA-KMP 
scheme, the vehicles, and the RSUs are given a public key 
repository where it contains the certified node ID and public 
key bindings issued by the RTA during the registration phase. 
This information is used to authenticate each other mutually in 
the key agreement step. Therefore, impersonation cannot 
succeed. The position of the nodes is also verified in the process 
which makes the impersonation even harder. Using shared keys 
for the symmetric encryption can also provide some level of 
authentication as the shared keys are only known to a group of 
vehicles. 
Repudiation Attack –By the proposed SA-KMP scheme, 
non-repudiation is achieved by employing digital signature in 
the public key request module and the key agreement module as 
well as requesting each vehicle to sign the key index of the 
shared key. 
Collusion Attack – By this attack, two or more vehicles may 
collude to capture the nodes to compromise the session keys or 
on a larger scale, to capture the whole key space. For this 
reason, the matrix based key [10], [11] and the probabilistic key 
sharing [12] schemes are required to change the keys 
periodically which increase the communication overhead. In 
the design of the proposed SA-KMP scheme, the keys are not 
preloaded to increase the resilience to node capture attacks. 
Instead, the key derivation module generates the keys on 
demand based on the current inputs to the plane equations. 
Even if a particular group of network entities is compromised, it 
only affects the communication in that particular region 
without jeopardizing the whole network. Moreover, the public 
key request module of the proposed SA-KMP scheme is 
resilient against the collusion attacks. Interested readers may 
refer to [9] for more details. 
B. Formal Verification by Proverif 
Proverif [29] is a software designed based on the Dolev and 
Yao attack model [21] to analyze the security of cryptographic 
protocols. It can verify whether a protocol satisfies secrecy, 
correspondence assertions and observational equivalence 
properties. In this paper, the secrecy and correspondence 
assertions of the key agreement module in Figure 3 are 
validated. To test the correspondence property, we define five 
events in the sub-processes of the vehicle and the RSU in 
Proverif. These five events which are also indicated in Figure 3 
are: (1) Event vSends1(𝑅𝑅𝒱𝒱), (2) Event rsuSends2(𝑅𝑅𝒱𝒱 , 𝑁𝑁ℛ ), (3) 
Event vSends3(𝑁𝑁ℛ , 𝑁𝑁𝒱𝒱, 𝑣𝑣𝒱𝒱 ), (4) Event termRSU(𝑁𝑁𝒱𝒱 , 𝑣𝑣𝒱𝒱 , 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑦𝑦ℛ) 
and (5) Event termVehicle( 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑦𝑦𝒱𝒱 ). These events create an 
ordered association between messages in the protocol to prove 
authentication property i.e. if an event has been executed, it 
implies another event has been previously executed. To verify 
the authenticity of the RSU, the following query syntax is used: 
 
query rand:nonce, rand1:nonce, rand2:nonce, 
rand3:bitstring, k1:key; 
inj-event(termVehicle(k1))==>(inj-event(termRSU 
(rand2,rand3,k1))==>(inj-event(vSends3(rand1,rand2, 
rand3))==>(inj-event(rsuSends2(rand,rand1))&&inj-event 
(vSends1 (rand))))). 
 
The above relationship implies that each termination of the 
vehicle has to be preceded by an instance of the following 
events: termRSU(), vSends3(), rsuSends2() and vSends1(). If 
the query result is true, it means that the RSU is properly 
authenticated. Otherwise, it is not. Similarly, we use the 
following query format below to test that the RSU completes 
the protocol with the target vehicle only when events vSends3, 
rsuSends2, and vSends1 are executed. 
 
query rand:nonce, rand1:nonce, rand2:nonce, 
rand3:bitstring, k1:key; 
inj-event(termRSU(rand2,rand3,k1)) ==> (inj-event 
(vSends3(rand1,rand2,rand3)) ==> (inj-event (rsuSends2 
(rand,rand1)) && inj-event(vSends1(rand)))). 
 
For both correspondence queries, the injective correspondence 
is used to capture the one-to-one relationship between the 
number of protocol runs performed by each participant. When 
the injective query is violated, it means that the protocol is 
subject to a replay attack and does not fulfill the authenticity 
property. Next, we verify the secrecy of the shared key by 
declaring out(c, senc(secretmessage, derived_key_rsu)) in 
the sub-process of the RSU. It means outputting a free name 
secretmessage encrypted using a key derived by the RSU onto 
the channel c. Then, we test the secrecy of the free name using 
the following query: query attacker(secretmessage). The free 
name secretmessage is secret if and only if the derived key, 
denoted by derived_key_rsu is secret. The results  of 
executing the key agreement protocol by Proverif are shown in 
Figure 5. Line 1-2 indicates that the attacker is unable to 
determine the derived key shared between the RSU and the 
vehicle. Hence, the secrecy of the derived key is preserved. 
Moreover, the results given in line 3-7 indicate that the injective 
authentication of the vehicle to the RSU and vice versa hold 
which means that the RSU and the vehicle participating in the 
protocol are both authenticated. In addition, it proves that the 
replay and the impersonation attacks are impossible to succeed 
by the attacker. As such, we conclude that our key agreement 
protocol is secure against an active attacker under the Dolev 
and Yao model. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Proverif verification results 
 
 
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF THE SA-KMP 
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the SA-KMP 
scheme in terms of the transmission and storage overhead, 
latency, scalability, key generation time and computational 
complexity. 
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A. Transmission Overhead 
We analyze the transmission overhead of the SA-KMP 
scheme and compare its performance with the certificate-based 
scheme in [5] and the PKR scheme in [18]. The comparison is 
made by evaluating the transmission overhead when a vehicle 
sends a packet to an RSU or vice versa. By the certificate-based 
scheme, the size of the certificate for a vehicle is 126 bytes and 
the size of the ECDSA signature that is created by a vehicle 
based on a key length of 224 bits is 56 bytes. Therefore, the 
total transmission overhead of a message is 126 + 56 𝑏𝑏𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠 = 182 𝑏𝑏𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠 as shown in Table III. By the SA-KMP scheme and 
the PKR scheme, the vehicles and the RSUs are given a copy of 
the directory which contains the public keys that have 
previously been verified by the RTA. Therefore, there is no 
need to attach the certificate in the message transmission which 
reduces the total transmission overhead to 56 bytes as shown in 
Table III. We further illustrate the transmission overhead 
improvement in Figure 6 by plotting the transmission overhead 
as a function of the number of messages received by an RSU in 
30 seconds. It is observed that both the SA-KMP and the PKR 
schemes have the lowest transmission overhead compared to 
that of the certificate based scheme even when the number of 
messages received at the RSU increases. The transmission 
overhead of the SA-KMP is 30.8% that of the certificate based 
scheme which means that our scheme saves about 69.2% of the 
communication bandwidth without transmitting certificates. 
B. Storage Overhead 
We estimate the storage required by each RSU and vehicle to 
maintain the VPFD and RSU-PFD repositories. According to 
[5], the public key size of an RSU and a vehicle is 33 bytes and 
29 bytes respectively, and the size of the RTA’s ECDSA 
signature is 64 bytes. If 4 bytes are used to store the vehicle ID 
and assuming there are 1 million vehicles in the network, the 
size    of    the    VPFD     held     by     each     RSU     would 
be 1 million x (29 + 4 + 64)bytes = 97 Mbytes as shown in 
Table IV, which is higher than 33 Mbytes required by the PKR 
scheme. This additional storage requirement is a trade-off for 
the enhanced security against the collusion attacks. On the 
other hand, if there are 100,000 RSUs deployed in the network, 
the size of the RSU-PFD which is maintained by each vehicle is 
equal to 100,000 x (33 + 4)bytes = 3.7Mbytes as shown in 
Table IV. Assuming the storage capacity of each vehicle and 
each RSU is 256M bytes, the storage costs of 97M bytes and 
3.7M bytes take up only about 37.9% and 1.45% of the storage 
space in each RSU and vehicle, respectively which is 
reasonable. In contrast, the certificate based PKI scheme 
requires each vehicle to store a set of certificates for the PKI 
support as suggested by [22] and [25]. However, the number of 
certificates to store is not specified and can vary according to 
various application requirements. For this reason, we express 
the storage overhead as a function of the number of certificates 
in Table IV. We note here that even if the storage requirement 
is lower than our scheme, the certificate based PKI scheme 
suffers from high latency due to the cumbersome certificate 
management. 
C. Latency Analysis 
Next, we analyze the latency of our scheme and compare the 
results to the certificate based PKI scheme [5] and the PKR 
TABLE III 
  COMPARISON OF TRANSMISSION OVERHEAD  
Scheme Sending a message 
Certificate based PKI [5] 182 bytes 
SA-KMP 56 bytes 
PKR [18] 56 bytes 
 
 
Fig. 6. Transmission overhead as a function of messages. 
TABLE IV 
COMPARISON OF STORAGE OVERHEAD 
Repository 
Scheme RSU -PFD VPFD 
SA-KMP 3.7M bytes 97M bytes 
PKR [18] - 33M bytes 
Certificate based PKI [5] 126bytes per certificate x no. of certificates 
scheme [18]. We define the latency as the amount of time a 
packet takes to travel from the source to the destination 
including the time taken to acquire the public key for verifying 
the message. In our analysis, we omit the transmission delay 
and the queuing delay and evaluate the latency as the sum of the 
propagation delay and the processing delay. Figure 7 illustrates 
the timing diagrams of the various schemes whereby the 
vertical arrows represent the processing delay while the 
diagonal or horizontal arrows represent the propagation delay. 
According to Figure 7(i), a vehicle has to send a message to 
an RSU to request for the public key of the target vehicle. To 
mitigate DoS attacks during the public key request, both 
vehicle and RSU exchange EC-Schnorr signatures which 
involve verification of proof. Thus, the main bulk of the 
processing delay in a V2V communication consists mainly of 
signature generation and verification times including the 
generation and verification of proof from both sides. On the 
other hand, the processing delay in a V2I communication is 
much simpler as the vehicle and RSU has a copy of the RSU-
PFD and VPFD respectively which eliminates the need to 
request    a   public    key.    Hence,    the   processing   delay is 
𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐ℎ + 𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑣𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦,𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅  + 𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛,𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅  while the propagation delay 
is 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥,𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚 𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 𝑐𝑐𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡.. By the certificate based PKI as 
shown in Figure 7(ii), the main delay is due to the downloading 
of the CRL and the verification of the certificates. Lastly, in the 
PKR scheme as illustrated in Figure 7(iii), the latency consists 
of  the delay in  acquiring the  public key from the  RSU which 
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Fig. 7. Latency of SA-KMP, Certificate based PKI and PKR Scheme 
 
involves generation and verification of an ECDSA signature. 
To evaluate the latency of each scheme numerically, we first 
implement the EC-Schnorr and the ECDSA signature schemes 
in C language using the Openssl package. Simulation has been 
carried out for 100000 times on a 32 bit Debian Linux operating 
system with 2 GB RAM running on an Intel Core i7-
2620M@2.70Ghz workstation. The signing and verification 
times of both signature schemes is averaged and presented in 
Table V. To calculate the propagation delay, we assume the 
followings according to the parameters given in [18]: 1) the size 
of an unsigned message = 69 bytes, 2) the size of a signed 
message = the size of an unsigned message (69 bytes) + the size 
of an ECDSA signature (56 bytes) = 125 bytes and 3) the size of 
a signed message including the certificate = size of a signed 
message (125 bytes) + size of a certificate (126 bytes) = 251 
bytes. The rest of the parameters as presented in Table VI are 
set according to the simulation results presented in [18]. 
With the help of Figure 7 and the values in Table V and 
Table VI, we tabulate the total latency of the three schemes in 
Table VII. Results show that the latency involved in the 
exchange of certificates and downloading of CRL by the 
certificate based PKI is several orders of the magnitude higher 
than that incurred in a V2V and V2I communication by the 
SA-KMP scheme. Moreover, the V2V communication latency 
by the SA-KMP scheme is lower than that by the PKR scheme 
even though an authentication is introduced against DoS 
 
 
TABLE V 
SIGNATURE SIGNING AND VERIFICATION TIMES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE VI 
OTHER EVALUATION PARAMETERS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE VII 
NETWORK LATENCY OF DIFFERENT SCHEMES 
Algorithm 
Key length 
EC-Schnorr ECDSA 
256 256 
Signing (ms) 0.154 1.486 
Verification (ms) 1.888 2.834 
Generate /Verify Proof (ms) 0.155 - 
 
Parameters Time 
𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐ℎ 0.000859 ms 
𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐𝑘𝑘 𝑐𝑐𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦 0 ms 
𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐𝑘𝑘 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 97.2975 ms 
𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘 0.9 Mbytes 
Data rate 6Mbps 
 
Schemes in V2V and V2I/I2V Network latency (ms) 
SA-KMP (V2V only) 12.309 
SA-KMP (V2I/I2V) 4.488 
Certificate based with CRL downloading 1365.911 
Certificate based without CRL downloading 117.097 
PKR (V2V only) 13.462 
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attacks. Our scheme is more superior because 1) no certificates 
are sent in the message transmission and 2) the EC-Schnorr 
signing operation is faster than the ECDSA as it does not 
involve modular inversions. Our scheme is also able to support 
V2I communication with a low network latency of 4.488ms 
which has not been addressed by the PKR scheme. These 
results show that the proposed SA-KMP scheme cannot 
introduce a very long delay time in acquiring public keys. 
D. Scalability 
In this section, we analyze the scalability of our scheme for 
an increasing number of users and compare our results to the 
certificate based PKI scheme [5] and the PKR scheme [18]. The 
scalability is evaluated in terms of three aspects: the 
transmission overhead, storage overhead, and the latency. In 
assessing the transmission overhead of our scheme, we 
consider two cases, namely the V2V and V2I communication. 
In the case of a V2V communication, a vehicle has to perform 
two rounds of authentication before the actual communication 
takes place. The first authentication is to retrieve the public key 
of the target vehicle while the second set of authentication is to 
exchange keying materials for the establishment of pairwise 
keys. Each round of the authentication process contains an EC-
Schnorr signature for mitigating DoS attacks. On the other 
hand, in a V2I communication, only one round of 
authentication is needed since the vehicle and the RSU have 
each other public key. Suppose the EC-Schnorr signature is 56 
bytes, the total transmission overhead generated by a vehicle in 
a V2V communication will be 112 bytes while the transmission 
overhead in a V2I communication is 56 bytes. In the PKI 
scheme, the transmission overhead is 182 bytes as given in 
Table III whereas, the transmission overhead of the PKR 
scheme is 56 bytes. In terms of storage overhead, we analyze 
the storage requirements for each vehicle and RSU in our 
scheme separately. We assume the number of RSU in the 
network remains constant at 1000 regardless of the increase in 
the vehicle population. In the certificate based PKI scheme, we 
assume that the storage overhead is due to the need to download 
and store the CRL list. Thus, we estimate the size of the CRL 
given in Table VIII based on a revocation rate of 10% and 
assuming that the CRL header size is 50 bytes, the RTA’s 
signature on the CRL is 64 bytes and each revoked certificate is 
9 bytes. 
Figure 8 shows a composite graph where the primary axis 
denotes the transmission overhead in logarithmic values while 
the secondary axis, also in logarithm scale, denotes the storage 
overhead requirements. From Figure 8, we observe that the 
transmission overhead of our scheme in a V2I communication 
is the same as the PKR scheme. But, in the case of a V2V 
communication, our scheme incurs a higher transmission 
overhead. This is due to the authentication mechanism 
introduced in the key agreement module to mitigate the 
flooding of invalid signatures. Nevertheless, the results suggest 
that the transmission overhead of our scheme is still lower than 
the classical PKI scheme. Suppose the typical data rate of a 
vehicular network is 27Mbps [23] and the transmission 
overhead in a V2V and V2I communication is 112 bytes and 56 
bytes respectively, it would mean that SA-KMP is able to 
support between 30,000 and 60,000 users concurrently in a 
 
 
Fig. 8. Scalability comparison in terms of transmission overhead and storage 
overhead 
TABLE VIII 
Various Parameters For Calculating The Latency 
Number of 
Users 
Number of 
revoked 
certificates 
𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔 
(Bytes) 
Certificate 
based PKI 
𝑻𝑻𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒔𝒔𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄 𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪 (ms) 
SA-KMP 
𝑻𝑻𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄 
(ms) 
100 10 204 0.023 0.000667 
1000 100 1014 0.071 0.00135 
10000 1000 9114 0.691 0.001663 
100000 10000 90114 7.910 0.003196 
1000000 100000 900114 125.987 0.008354 
 
 
Fig. 9. Scalability in terms of latency experienced by a user 
V2V and V2I communication respectively. In contrast, the 
certificate based PKI scheme could only support up to 18,500 
users since the transmission overhead is high at 182 bytes due 
to the sending of a certificate and an ECDSA signature for each 
communication. Even though the PKR scheme can support 
about 60,000 users which is similar to the SA-KMP in a V2I 
communication, we emphasize that the PKR scheme does not 
have protection against DoS attacks which is the main benefit 
of our scheme. With regard to the storage overhead, it is evident 
that VPFD in our scheme is higher than the PKR scheme as we 
are storing the RTA’s signature in the repository. However, the 
RSU-PFD which is maintained by each vehicle remains 
constant throughout because the RSU population rarely 
increase in the network. Suppose the storage space to store an 
entry corresponding to a vehicle and RSU is 97 bytes and 37 
bytes respectively (discussed in Section VI-B), the total storage 
space required to store 1 million vehicles and 1000 RSUs by 
each RSU and vehicle will be about 97 Mbytes and 0.037 
Mbytes respectively. This storage requirement is negligible 
given that modern-day OBU has a storage capacity of 8GB 
[26]. This observation supports our claim that SA-KMP is 
Manuscript ID VTCV-2015-01739.R3 13 
highly scalable in terms of increasing users. Even though the 
 
3 
3 
certificate-based scheme has the lowest storage overhead, the 
main disadvantage of using certificates is that the latency is 
high due to the downloading of CRL which we analyze next. 
To evaluate the latency of our scheme, we develop a C 
program to measure the time taken to search for a public key in 
the VPFD. We further develop another C program to estimate 
the time required to check the validity of the certificate against 
the CRL of the certificate based PKI scheme. The search 
operations by both programs are evaluated for a different 
number of users ranging from 100 to 100000 and the average 
timing is taken over 100 simulation runs. Table VIII shows the 
simulation results for different parameters under 
considerations. It is obvious that the searching time by the PKR 
scheme is the same as that of the SA-KMP scheme. Using the 
values in Table V and Table VI, we calculate the latency of 
each scheme by evaluating the propagation delay and the 
processing delay as per Figure 7. Figure 9 shows the latency 
performance of the three schemes for a different number of 
users in the network. According to Figure 9, the latency to 
deploy the certificate based PKI scheme increases sharply 
when the number of users is beyond 10,000. This is due to the 
large CRL which results in a longer time to download and to 
search for a certificate. On the other hand, the latency in a V2V 
and V2I communication based on our scheme remains constant 
at around 12.5ms and 5ms irrespective of the number of users in 
the network. Furthermore, according to the left inset figure in 
Figure 9, the latency of the SA-KMP scheme is lower than that 
of the PKR scheme even though an authentication mechanism 
is introduced to mitigate the DoS attacks. These results 
conclude that our scheme is highly scalable to cope with an 
increasing number of users. 
E. Key Generation Time 
We develop a C program based on the key derivation 
module described in our scheme to calculate the time required 
to compute a pairwise key. The program is developed to solve a 
system of plane equations and performing hashing operations 
to derive the keys. First, we investigate the effects of varying 
the network size on the key generation time. After that, we 
study the relationship between the key generation time and the 
number of plane equations. 
In the first experiment, we fix the number of plane 
equations 𝑁𝑁 as 3 and we vary the modulus 𝑚𝑚 operator in the 
equation (4) to be a prime number that approximates the 
network size between 0.5km and 10km. After that, we run the 
simulation 1000 times to measure the average key generation 
time and compare the results of our scheme to the ECDH 
protocol [17] and the DH protocol [16]. Results in Figure 10 
show that the average key generation time of the SA-KMP 
scheme is much lower than the DH protocol across the whole 
range of network sizes. Our scheme also outperforms the 
ECDH-256 and ECDH-224 protocols when the network size is 
smaller than 9km and 8km respectively. Furthermore, it can be 
seen in Figure 10 that the key generation time increases linearly 
with the network size. This is because the common keys are 
derived based on hashing the equation (4) a number of times 
according to the solution point. As the network size increases, it 
requires more hashing operations to determine the keys. To 
make our scheme more scalable in terms of the network size, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 10. Key generation time as a function of network size 
 
 
Fig. 11. Key generation time as a function of plane equations 
we can reduce the number of hashing operations by taking the 
modulus (𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚) of the solution points. The modulus 𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 can 
either be a fixed parameter pre-determined by the RTA during 
the registration phase or it can be a parameter determined by the 
key requestor during the key agreement phase. The extended 
version of the SA-KMP scheme with reduced hashing 
operations is simulated using modulus 𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 = 100 and the 
result is represented by the line with the green triangular 
markers in Figure 10. With reference to the secondary axis on 
Figure 10, the average key generation time for the extended 
version of the SA-KMP scheme is reduced and it remains 
constant at about 0.025ms throughout the various network 
sizes. 
Next, we study the effects of increasing the number of plane 
equations 𝑁𝑁 on the key generation time. In this experiment, the 
network size is fixed at 5km with modulus 𝑚𝑚 = 4999 and the 
number of plane equations is varied from 3 to 10. The 
simulation is repeated for 1000 times to compute the average 
key generation time. Figure 11 shows that the key generation 
time increases exponentially with the number of plane 
equations. This is because there are 𝑁𝑁(𝑁𝑁 − 1)(𝑁𝑁 − 2) groups 
of equations to solve and 𝑁𝑁(𝑁𝑁 − 1)(𝑁𝑁 − 2) keys being 
generated for 𝑁𝑁 plane equations. Although simulation result 
shows that it only takes about 0.93 seconds to generate 720 
keys with 10 plane equations, the key generation time is going 
to scale up exponentially with respect to 𝑁𝑁 which renders our 
scheme time-inefficient. To address this issue, we can 
randomly solve any combinations out of (𝑁𝑁) where 𝑁𝑁 is the 
number of plane equations given. For example, if 𝑁𝑁 = 4 and 
assuming all the plane equations issued by the RTA are 
indexed, (𝑁𝑁) results in the following combinations where 
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#number   refers   to   the   ID   of   the   given   plane equation: {#1, #2, #3}, {#1, #2, #4}, {#1, #3, #4}, {#2, #3, #4}. The  key 
requestor can choose any sets out of the 4 combinations above 
to derive the common keys. If the key requestor chooses 3 sets 
from the possible combinations to solve, there will be 18 keys 
instead of 24. In this way, key generation time can be reduced. 
This makes our scheme highly configurable and flexible. 
F. Computational Complexity 
Next, we evaluate the computational complexity of the SA-
KMP scheme by counting the number of CPU cycles it takes 
to execute in both V2V and V2I communication scenarios. In 
the V2V communication, both communicating parties need to 
acquire the public keys first before establishing the pairwise 
keys. Therefore, the complexity comes from the operations in 
the public key request module and the key derivation module. 
On the other hand, the complexity in a V2I communication is 
dominated by the operations of the key derivation module. 
To determine the number of CPU cycles, we insert the read 
timestamp counter and processor (rdtscp ID) instruction in the 
C programs of the public key request module and the key 
derivation module. Both programs are executed for 1000 times 
on a 32 bit Debian Linux operating system running on an Intel 
Core i7-2620M processor workstation. Table IX shows the 
average number of CPU cycles needed for both V2V and V2I 
communication. Simulation results show that the V2V 
communications require 70.84 megacycles to complete which 
is about 57.4% higher than the V2I communications. The 
increase is due to the additional operations to acquire the public 
keys in the public key request module. When our scheme is 
implemented on an OBU with a processor @500MHz [26], the 
computation time for the V2I and V2V communication 
scenarios can be calculated as follows: 
𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇 = 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑘𝑘 𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑦𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚⁄𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑘𝑘 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘 = 58.60 ms 
and 141.68 ms respectively, which fulfills the latency 
requirements of typical VN applications. These results 
demonstrate the feasibility of our scheme in the real world 
settings. 
TABLE IX 
NUMBER OF CYCLES FOR C IMPLEMENTATION OF SA-KMP 
 
Types of 
Comm. 
Number of CPU Cycles in 
megacycles 
Total CPU 
cycles in 
megacycles 
OBU 
@500MHz 
Public Key 
Request 
Module 
Key 
Derivation 
Module 
Computational 
time (CT) 
V2I / I2V - 29.30 29.30 58.60ms 
V2V / I2I 41.54 29.30 70.84 141.68ms 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have proposed the SA-KMP scheme that 
leverages on the PKR scheme and the 3D matrix key agreement 
scheme to reduce the latency and the complexity of a certificate 
based PKI. The PKR scheme eliminates the complex certificate 
verification process while the 3D matrix key agreement scheme 
establishes symmetric keys to replace the expensive 
asymmetric cryptography. Through numerical analysis, we 
have shown that SA-KMP scheme is more efficient and 
scalable than the certificate based PKI scheme in terms of the 
network latency and transmission overhead, albeit a higher 
storage requirement. When compared to the PKR scheme, the 
transmission overhead and the storage overhead of SA-KMP is 
higher because of the extra authentication and the storing of 
RTA’s signature to combat DoS attacks and collusion attacks 
respectively. Nevertheless, the communication latency of the 
SA-KMP is still lower than the PKR scheme. In addition, 
despite the higher storage cost, the storage requirement is still 
well below the storage limit of a modern OBU with 8GB 
storage space [26]. Besides, we have shown that the SA-KMP 
scheme is highly configurable in terms of establishing pairwise 
keys. We have also demonstrated that under the DoS attacks, 
the SA-KMP scheme outperforms the ECDSA based schemes 
with a lower authentication delay. Lastly, the SA-KMP scheme 
is verified to be robust against a broad range of attacks using 
both formal and informal verifications. For future works, we 
plan to extend our scheme to establish group keys among 
vehicles without the help of an RSU and look into the privacy 
related issues. 
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